Teleological reduction is an established component of legal methodology, even though it is not without controversy. Particularly in criminal law, it has long enjoyed great popularity and, in many places, has led to modifications of the Criminal Code. Against this background, it is surprising that the theoretical foundations of this doctrine have so far scarcely been the subject of in-depth legal scholarship. The aim of the present study was to clarify the unresolved questions that remain regarding the use of this instrument in criminal law. Kristina Peters concludes that teleological reduction can be viewed as a phenomenon through which the level of development of legal scholarship in general, and criminal law scholarship in particular, can be examined. Her analysis shows that the system of legal scholarship-and criminal law scholarship specifically-has reached a high level of development, even if certain gaps are still apparent. In the course of an axiomatic reconstruction of teleological reduction, it can be interpreted as a legal theory composed of meaning-proclamation procedures, substantive axioms (including their domain-specific manifestations), and domain-specific doctrine. When applied in criminal law, it does not pursue an outdated ideal such as realizing a "true meaning" or a notion of "justice" detached from the law. Rather, it is a highly domain-specific instrument of flexibilization, capable of eliminating teleological disruptions within the axiomatic network.
